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THE STATUS OF CORPORATIONS IN THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE SEARCH FOR PERSONHOOD
Michael J. Kelly*
Can corporations be prosecuted for complicity in genocide? While
companies do not typically carry out genocides on their own, they often
provide the necessary means such as supplying Saddam Hussein with chemical gas components to perpetrate the Kurdish genocide, machetes to the
Rwandan government to further the Rwandan genocide, or small arms to
Bosnian Serb militias to exterminate Bosniak males at Srebrenica.1
Pursuit of this deceptively simple question leads into a complex
scholarly inquiry.2 One aspect of this inquiry, and the subject of this short
essay, is whether the drafters of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide (Genocide Convention) conceived that such might
be the case.3 After all, while corporations like Krupps were implicated at
Nuremberg, it was only individual corporate officers, not the companies,
that were formally prosecuted for crimes amounting to genocide.4
In 2007, the International Court of Justice held that states could
commit genocide.5 So if states can commit genocide, then, logically, why
cannot other legal persons, namely corporations?
*

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research & International Programs,
Creighton University School of Law. Professor Kelly is President of the U.S. National Chapter of L‘Association Internationale de Droit Pénal (AIDP) and a member of the International
Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS). The author notes with profound thanks the work
of Hirad Abtahi and Philippa Webb in developing and publishing the travaux of the Genocide Convention, which aided the examination of this essay‘s central question immeasurably.
1
See Norm Dixon, How the U.S. Armed Sadaam Hussein with Chemical Weapons,
GREEN LEFT WEEKLY (Aug. 28, 2002), http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/26825 (explaining
how the United States helped Iraq develop its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons
programs). See LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER—THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 56
(Verson 2006) (explaining how corporations supplied weapons that were used in the Rwandan genocide).
2
Other equally important threshold questions concerning the status of corporations under
international law, amenability to prosecution, and tribunal jurisdiction are pursued elsewhere
and not covered in this segment of the broader inquiry.
3
See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (defining genocide to be a
crime under international law in times of peace or in times of war).
4
See Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International
Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1105–1111 (2009).
5
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶¶ 143, 413 (Feb. 26),
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First, what is genocide? The illegal acts of genocide are defined in
the Genocide Convention:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.6

Second, who can commit genocide? Article 6 of the Genocide Convention covers individual responsibility: ―Persons committing genocide or
any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether
they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.‖7 There is no artificial distinction between natural or legal (juridical) in either the reference to ―persons‖ or ―private individuals,‖ whereas
such distinction is specifically made in later international criminal treaties.
Thus, corporate liability could therein lurk.
An exploration of what the Genocide Convention drafters were
thinking does not dampen this prospect. The authoritative interpretive guide
to treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, urges one to first
look to the plain meaning of the words in the treaty and, should ambiguity
remain, to resort to an examination of the preparatory notes to divine the
drafters‘ intent.8 During the exact period when the Genocide Convention
was being negotiated from 1946–1948, the legal definition of ―person‖ according to Ballentine was:
Persons are divided by law into persons natural and persons artificial, and ‗person‘ prima facie, at common law and apart from any statutory

available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (deciding that under Article I of
the Genocide Convention, states are obligated not to commit genocide and that under Article
IX of the Convention, the ICJ has jurisdiction to decide a state‘s responsibility for committing genocide in violation of the Convention).
6
Genocide Convention, supra note 3, art II.
7
Id. art. VI.
8
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31–32, done May 23, 1969, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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enactment, includes both natural and artificial persons, and therefore as a
general rule includes corporations.9
Moreover, the criminal versus civil nature of the Genocide Convention was not dispositive as to whether corporations would be included in the
term ―person,‖ according to the usage of the term well prior to time of the
drafting conference:
Corporations are to be deemed and considered as persons when the circumstances in which they are placed are identical with those of natural
persons expressly included in a statute; and prima facie the word ‗person‘
in a statute, though penal, which is intended to inhibit an act, means ‗person in law;‘ that is, an artificial, as well as a natural, person, and therefore
includes corporations if they are within the spirit and purpose of the statute.10

References to corporations or legal or juridical persons in the travaux preparatoires is meager. But, as the above commentary makes clear,
in conjunction with the discussion of who could commit genocide, it was on
the minds of several delegates. Specifically, the Soviet delegate emphasized
corporate liability in the context media and press organizations using propaganda to incite to genocide.11 The delegate was also in favor of blanket application of liability, ―stress[ing] the fact that the fundamental idea of article
V [liability] of the draft convention was to proclaim that all those committing genocide, no matter who they were, should be punished.‖12

9

13 AM. JUR. Corporations § 9 (1938). BALLENTINE‘S LAW DICTIONARY 622 (2d ed.
1948). This understanding reflects a long history recognizing that both rights and duties
devolve onto corporations as legal persons. See HORACE L. WILGUS, CASES ON THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§1–10 (1902). 7 CORPORATIONS
REPRINTED FROM RULING CASE LAW §3 (1915) (―The corporation is the real though artificial
person substituted for the natural persons who procured its creation . . . It must do all corporate acts in its corporate name. . . . Neither a portion nor all of the natural persons who compose a corporation . . . are the corporation itself. . . .‖). See also id. at §8 (where corporations
were held by courts to constitute ―persons‖ as that term was used in the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and in an 1873 treaty between the United States and England
prohibiting future confiscations, and §9 reiterating that corporations should be presumed
covered in statutory language).
10
CORPORATIONS REPRINTED, supra note 9, §9.
11
1 HIRAD ABTAHI AND PHILIPPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES 741–49 (2008). The Soviet delegate also introduced a new article contemplating organizational liability for organizations that ―aimed at stirring up racial, national or
religious hatred and inciting to commission of acts of genocide‖ but this motion was defeated. Id. at 1799–1814. Although the proposal was explained by the Czech delegate to
encompass only groups like the Gestapo, the S.A., and the S.S., the United States stridently
opposed it as an assault on freedom of the press. Id. at 1809.
12
Id. at 1591–92 (emphasis added).
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Other delegates made oblique references to legal persons in the context of the debate over the term ―constitutionally responsible rulers.‖13
Whether such references reflected an intentional application to the corporate
body considered in this essay or to governments in their corporate context
remains an open question. The delegates certainly referred to governments
and states, as the U.S. delegate reflected on the 96th meeting, ―It had then
been decided that corporate bodies such as Governments and States should
not be included in the list of those to be held responsible for the commission
of genocide.‖14 But did these references embrace companies? We simply do
not know.
For instance, the Venezuelan delegate was skeptical about bringing
legal persons before an international tribunal, noting, ―it was easy to picture
the difficulty of bringing judgment the corporate bodies which, as a general
rule, were the perpetrators of the crime of genocide.‖15 The Swedish delegate favored an interpretation limiting liability due to the fact that ―the
Swedish criminal code did not recognize the idea of penal responsibility of
legal persons‖—a position echoed by the delegate from the Dominican Republic.16 And the French delegate noted that ―The French idea of penal responsibility applied to individuals only, for only individuals could commit
crimes; it could not apply to corporate bodies or to abstract communities.‖17
But the delegate from the Philippines declared that ―any individual
guilty of genocide should be punished, whoever he might be.‖18 And, finally, summing up the debate, the delegate from Luxembourg said: ―The question under consideration was to decide who would be liable to punishment
for the crime of genocide. [T]he Committee had decided that all individuals,
whether they were constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals, would be responsible for the act of genocide.‖19
So inclusion of corporations in the term ―persons‖ is not foreclosed
by a reading of the travaux; nor is inclusion of corporations in the term
―private individuals.‖20 Indeed, the Chinese delegate noted that ―genocide
13

Id. at 1592–96.
Id. at 1694.
15
Id. at 1222. Although the Venezuelan delegate could have been referring to states and
governments by using the term corporate bodies, this is somewhat unclear as reference is
made by other delegates to states and heads of states as chief perpetrators of genocide. See,
e.g., the statement of the Pakistani delegate, id. at 1595 (noting that, most often, genocide is
committed by heads of state).
16
Id. at 1595, 1662 (―[U]nder the national legislation of his country, legal entities could
not be held guilty of committing a crime‖).
17
Id. at 1617. Chaumont went on to endorse the phrase ―responsible rulers‖ for inclusion
in draft article V.
18
Id. at 1642.
19
Id. at 1655 (emphasis added).
20
Id. at 1593–94. One of the few exclusionary elucidations on this last point came from
the Syrian delegate who said, when considering what to do with de facto heads of state, ―they
14
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could also be committed by private organizations.‖21 And the Swedish delegate specifically included ―private organizations‖ in his references to ―private individuals‖ in the debate beating back a French amendment to exclude
private individuals from liability altogether:
According to the French amendment, genocide could by committed only
by rulers or at least with their connivance or collusion; acts of genocide
committed by private individuals or by private organizations would not be
subject to the terms of the convention . . . The Swedish delegation did not
think that the force of the convention would be weakened if cases of genocide committed by private individuals or private organizations were included among the acts to which the convention applied. For one thing, it
should not be forgotten that such cases might well occur. Furthermore, it
should be kept in mind that . . . the draft convention . . . provided for the
punishment of certain offences, such as direct instigation to commit genocide, which preceded the crime and were generally committed by private
individuals or private organizations without any participation on the part
of the rulers.22

Again, any indication of inclusion is merely speculative, as it was
the Swedish delegate who reminded the drafters that legal persons could not
be prosecuted in the discussion about heads of state, but then also coupled
private organizations with private individuals.23 But there is equally no definitive exclusion apparent in the travaux. Consequently, one may certainly
argue that ―persons‖ and ―private individuals‖ does not preclude the inclusion of corporations as legal persons.24

would not be included in the category of ‗private individuals‘ envisaged in article V—since
that category referred only to private individuals who were neither officials nor heads of
State.‖ Id. at 1594.
21
Id. at 724. This was in the debate over what to do with political groups. Eventually
political groups were specifically taken out as a protected class at the insistence of the Soviets, but were arguably left in as potential perpetrators. Id. at 2029. The Chinese delegate
also ―expressed doubts about the inclusion of both political groups and groups of opinion in
the definition. If such groups were included, there was, in fact, no good reason why social,
economic and other groups should not be included.‖ Id. at 724.
22
Id. at 1462 (emphasis added). In this same vein, the delegate from the Philippines observed in a later debate on incitement, ―[E]ven from the political point of view, the prohibition of incitement to genocide by private individuals or groups acting independently of their
Governments could only relieve international tension, and not increase it.‖ Id. at 1541.
23
Id. at 1462–63. The Swedish delegation was arguing against the French amendment and
its exclusion of private individuals from Article II of the Convention.
24
Black‘s Law Dictionaries of the period are no help in resolving this matter. Both the
third edition (1933) and the fourth edition (1951) track BALLENTINE‘s dichotomy (above),
and note:
It has been held that when the word person is used in a legislative act, natural persons will be
intended unless something appear in the context to show that it applies to artificial persons
(citations to court cases omitted). But as a rule corporations will be considered persons with-
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Not surprisingly, there is a split in the legal academic literature on
this point. Some scholars, including the dean of Yale‘s law school, argue
that corporations can aid or abet genocide under Article 4 of the Genocide
Convention.25 Others have adopted a more restrictive interpretation of the
list of possible perpetrators of genocide:
The language of the Genocide Convention is indicative of an intention to
confine liability under international law for acts of genocide to natural persons only. It provides that ―persons‖ committing genocide, or any of the
other acts included in the Genocide Convention‘s proscriptions, shall be
punished. Although ―persons‖ as a juridical concept includes natural as
well as juristic persons, the Article expressly refers to ―responsible rulers,
public officials or private individuals‖ as examples of persons who might
be punishable. Restrictive interpretation of this provision—the general
norm of construction that applies to punitive provisions—and in particular
application of the eiusdem generis rule, would suggest that an accused under the Genocide Convention, ought to be confined to those who have
something in common with ―responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals:‖ that is, natural persons to the exclusion of juristic persons,
including the state as a corporate body with legal subjectivity.26

Similarly, there is a split in the judiciary on the matter. District
Court Judge Allen Schwartz used the argument to rebuff the corporate defendant‘s assertion in Talisman Energy that the Nuremberg trials focused
only on individual corporate officers and not the corporate entities themselves.27 Allegations of complicity in genocide had been leveled against the
company in that case:

in the statutes unless the intention of the legislature is manifestly to exclude them (citations
to court cases omitted).
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1355 (3d ed. 1933); BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1300 (4th ed.
1951). As the travaux neither specifically includes nor excludes corporations in the term
persons, assuming the drafting committee could be analogized to a legislature and the resulting draft treaty to a statute, the question remains unresolved.
25
Harold Hongju Ku, Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 263, 266 (2004).
26
Johan D. Van Der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23
FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 286, 290 (1999). See also, Ben Saul, In The Shadow Of Human Rights:
Human Duties, Obligations, And Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 565,
596 (2001) (―International human rights law presently recognizes the implied recognition of
correlative duties owed to facilitate the exercise of specific rights. Yet many early human
rights treaties were ‗silent as to the roles of other or alternative addressees in regard to promoting and protecting specific rights.‘ For example, the Genocide Convention envisaged
only the punishment of natural ‗persons,‘ and was silent on the responsibility of governments, corporations, media entities, or political parties.‖)(emphasis added).
27
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 316
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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The concept of corporate liability for jus cogens violations has its
roots in the trials of German war criminals after World War II. The Nuremberg Charter permitted the prosecution of ―a group or organization‖ and
allowed the tribunal to declare that entity a ―criminal organization.‖ In
United States v. Flick, United States v. Krauch, and United States v. Krupp,
the heads of major German corporations were prosecuted for, inter alia, war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Talisman points out, correctly, that in
each of these cases, individuals, and not corporate entities, were put on trial.
However, it ignores the fact that the court consistently spoke in terms of
corporate liability:
With reference to the charges in the present indictment concerning Farben‘s [a German corporation] activities in Poland, Norway, AlsaceLorraine, and France, we find that the proof establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that offenses against property as defined in Control Council Law
No. 10 were committed by Farben, and that these offenses were connected
with, and an inextricable part of the German policy for occupied countries.
[. . .]. The action of Farben and its representatives, under these circumstances, cannot be differentiated from acts of plunder or pillage committed
by officers, soldiers, or public officials of the German Reich. [. . .] Such
action on the part of Farben constituted a violation of the Hague Regulations [on the conduct of warfare] (citing United States v. Krauch).28

The language of the decision makes it clear that the court considered that the corporation qua corporation had violated international law.
The same logic guided the court in a case involving the Krupp corporation:
The confiscation of the Austin plant [a tractor factory owned by the Rothschilds] [. . .] and its subsequent detention by the Krupp firm constitute a
violation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations [. . . and] the Krupp firm,
through defendants[, . . .] voluntarily and without duress participated in
these violations. (citing United States v. Krupp).29

As in Krauch, the Krupp court makes it clear that while individuals
were nominally on trial, the Krupp company itself, acting through its employees, violated international law. The Nuremberg precedent cited above is
particularly significant not merely because it constitutes a basis for finding
corporate liability for violations of international law, but because the language ascribes to the corporations involved the necessary mens rea for the
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity—the types of criminal behavior at issue in the instant case.30

28
29
30

Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 315–16.
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Thus, the concept of holding corporations accountable under international criminal law for their complicity in genocide has been around for
some time, even if it has not been acted upon. While no currently constituted international tribunal would have jurisdiction over such a case, nothing in the Genocide Convention appears to prevent one from commencing.
This is an important point if, perhaps in the future, one of the competent
international criminal tribunals is vested with that jurisdiction.
Along with rights come responsibilities. The rights of corporations
have expanded greatly in the age of globalization, but there has not been a
commensurate effort to impose obligations—such as compliance with the
jus cogens norm codified in the Genocide Convention against the commission of genocide. If corporations are ―persons‖ under the law, then they
should be more fully so. If the result of holding corporations liable for their
actions is the disarming of tyrants who seek to carry out genocide—few
since the Second World War manufacture their own weapons—then perhaps
fewer genocides would be committed, or at least the scale of massacre
might be reduced. That result is certainly worth the effort.

